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Conflict of Laws-A Survey of Past
and Contemporary Theory
By Joim A. GoBmFLXL*
[A] law of conflict of conflict of laws has been an essential part of
our law of confficts .... .
F OR THE last fifteen years the field of conflict of laws, particularly
the part that is concerned with choice-of-law doctrines, has been in
a state of evolutionary ferment.2 The theoretical bases previously
revered as dogma are being doubted and in many instances discarded.
Choice-of-law rules previously regarded as required by constitutional
mandate are being questioned; the very existence of any constitutional
mandate is being denied.3 The nature of this ferment may be simply
stated. After over one hundred years of assuming that a forum, in
most cases, should or must adjudicate rights and duties arising out of
a foreign based event in accordance with the laws of the place where
the event took place,4 courts and writers are now asserting that a
forum may and should adjudicate those rights and duties in accordance
with its own law unless there is good reason to do otherwise. The
major role in this development is being played by state courts, with
the California Supreme Court one of the most prominent. Because its
work has been so significant in the development of law in California
*A.B., 1926, University of California; J.D., 1929, University of California; J.S.D.,
1931, University of California; Professor of Law and Dean, School of Law, Golden Gate
College; member, California Bar.
I EmENzwEiG, ConruaCr oF LAws § 4, at 12 n.30 (1962).
2 See generally the symposium New Trends in the Conflict of Laws, 28 LAw &
Coxmn'. PaoB. 673 (1963); Cavers, Cheatham, Currie, Ehrenzweig, Leflar & Reese,
Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, a Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 CoLum.
L. REV. 1212 (1963). For a comprehensive review as of twenty years ago see Cheatham,
American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58 HAIv. L. REv. 361
(1945).
8 See Em Nzwma, CoNruc oF LAws § 9 (1962).
4 "I had supposed, before Hughes v. Fetter ... that the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania could close its courts to trial of this case. But no one would have questioned,
I should think, that if the cause were entertained it must be tried in accordance with the
law of the place of the wrong:' Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 522-23
(1953) (dissenting opinion of Jackson, J., Black and Minton, JJ., concurring). (Em-
phasis added.) "It is the settled law in the United States that an action in tort is
governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the tort was committed ... ." Loranger
v. Nadeau, 215 Cal. 362, 366, 10 P.2d 63, 65 (1932).
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and in other jurisdictions,' it is appropriate that an issue of this Journal
be devoted to this subject. The later articles will discuss in depth the
California decisions in selected areas of the subject. It is the purpose
of this article to set the stage by providing a survey of past and con-
temporary theory as a basis for better understanding of what follows.
But first, three pleas by way of confession and avoidance. (1) This
introductory article is admittedly only a survey and a synthesis. It
does not purport to provide a scholarly or critical analysis of any
doctrine or theory or to advance any doctrines or theories of its own.
It is intended to depict what has happened and what is now happen-
ing rather than what one author may think should be happening.
(2) In the task of depicting what is happening, within the limited
space allotted, the treatment of the views of current scholars must,
of necessity, be superficial. I trust that within those limits I do justice
to those whose views I have attempted to state. If I err, I can only
plead that I have attempted to state those views as they appear to me.
(3) Again due to limitations of space it is impossible to do justice to
all the recent scholarly writings on conflict of laws. The wealth of
critical and analytical comment is overwhelming. To those who are
uncited or unacknowledged I apologize.
American Choice of Law Theory in Historical
Perspective."'Comity" and Joseph Story
American choice of law theory starts with the writings of Joseph
Story.0 Having little in the way of English precedents Story relied
primarily on the continental jurists and scholars. In essence Story
assumed that a forum adjudicating a matter arising out of a foreign
based event would, as a matter of comity, look to and utilize the for-
eign law as its basis for decisi6n. As thus expounded, comity was little
more than "courtesy."7 A forum was expected, but not required, to
look to foreign law. Why it should do so was never fully articulated.
During the nineteenth century Story's views predominated in the
American courts.
5 See, e.g., Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953), cited in the
following cases: Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 12 n.26 (1962); Pearson v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553, 559 (2d Cir. 1962); Babcock v. Jackson, 12
N.Y.2d 473, 481 n.10, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283 n.10, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 749 n.10 (1963).
6 See generally Em NzwEio, CoNFLicr OF LAWS passim (1962).
7 But cf. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) (discussing recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign judgments in terms of comity).
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Vested Rights and Imperative Rules-Holmes, Beale,
and the Restatement
During the first half of the present century conflict of laws theory
was dominated by the doctrine that the law of the place where an
event occurred determined the rights and obligations arising out of
that event, and any forum in which an action was brought was bound
to apply that law. What Story had advocated as a matter of comity
now became an obligation. In some instances this obligation to recog-
nize the law of another state was said to be governed by conflict of
laws rules;8 in other instances the obligation was elevated to a consti-
tutional command under the due process and full faith and credit
clauses.
Under this view the forum did not seek a rule of law to govern the
case; it sought a jurisdiction whose rule, regardless of its content,
governed the case.9 In this framework choice-of-law rules enjoyed
the status of Euclidean axioms before the development of non-
Euclidean geometry, and became unquestioned basic truths to be
applied automatically in any given situation. All the forum had to
do was find the place of the tort or the place of the making of the
contract or whatever place it was told to find, and once that place
had been located the law of that place controlled the effect and
consequences of the act in issue.
On the bench this view is principally associated with the opinions
of Mr. Justice Holmes. His first full exposition was in a tort case,
Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., in 1904:
The theory of the foreign suit is that although the act complained
8 See, e.g., Loranger v. Nadeau, 215 Cal. 362, 366, 10 P.2d 63, 65 (1932). But see
Gray v. Gray, 87 N.H. 82, 174 Atl. 508 (1934), overruled by Thompson v. Thompson,
105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963), where the suit was between spouses domiciled in
New Hampshire and involved an auto accident in Maine. In holding that the issue of
interspousal immunity would be determined in accordance with Maine law, the court
advanced the following hodgepodge of reasons: "The local law is that the foreign rights
will be enforced. What those rights are depends upon the facts, and a part of the facts
consists in the law under which the transactions took place.... We enforce the foreign
law because it is our law that the foreign law shall govern the transactions in question ....
The lex loci is applied because this is deemed to be the sensible course to pursue ....
No rule or set of rules has yet been devised which will make the conflict of laws a logical
whole. There are places where logic has to give way to evident facts. In these places
horse sense has prevailed over the deductions of the schoolmen." 87 N.H. at 87, 89, 174
Atl. at 510-12.
9 See Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HAsv. L. REv. 173
(1933); Coum, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of
Laws, 10 STx. L. REsv. 205 (1958), in SELECTED EssAYs ON TnE CONFLICT OF L ws 128
(1963).
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of was subject to no law having force in the forum, it gave rise to an
obligation, an obligatio, which, like other obligations, follows the
person, and may be enforced wherever the person may be found....
But as the only source of this obligation is the law of the place of
the act, it follows that that law determines not merely the existence
of the obligation ... but ,equally determines its extent. 10
In two decisions involving life insurance contracts, New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Dodge" in 1918 and Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing'2 in
1922, a refusal of the forum to apply the law of the place of making
of the contract was said to be a denial of due process of law. Thus,
in the Liebing decision Mr. Justice Holmes, again speaking for the
court, stated: "[T]he Constitution and the first principles of legal
thinking allow the law of the place where a contract is made to deter-
mine the validity and the consequences of the act."13
Although Mr. Justice Holmes asserted that there were "first prin-
ciples" which required certain choices of law, there was considerable
difficulty in determining what those first principles were, where they
were to be found, and why, as a matter of any legal theory, they were
so. Holmes had expressed the view that law is not a brooding omni-
presence in the sky but the voice of an articulate sovereign,'4 and had
recognized that whatever else it might be, the law of one state was
not "law" in a foreign forum.'5 What then did the forum do when it
decided that the rights of the parties had to be determined in accord-
ance with the laws of another state?
The question posed is not a single question, but in fact two separate
questions. First, why did the forum look to the law of the other state
at all? Second, having looked and decided it governed, how did it
apply this "foreign law" in its own courts?
The first of these two questions was answered by the concept of
"legislative jurisdiction."'6 Every state, it was declared, had the power
to determine the legal consequences of an event taking place within
its jurisdiction, to confer rights, privileges, and immunities, and im-
pose duties and obligations on the parties to an event. Thus, the event
10 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904); see also Holmes' opinions in Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222
U.S. 473 (1912) (another tort case) and American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213
U.S. 347 (1909) ( a civil anti-trust suit). Compare American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., supra, with Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
11246 U.S. 357 (1918).
12259 U.S. 209 (1922).
1 Id. at 214.
14 Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917).
15 See text accompanying note 10 supra.
16See generally RESTATEmNT, CONFLiCT OF LAws §§ 59-70 (1934); 1 BEALE.
CoNicsT oF LAws § 59.1 (1935).
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plus the law of the place where the event took place created an obli-
gation to be enforced wherever the action was tried. In fact this answer
was no answer. The concept of "legislative jurisdiction" did not answer
the question of why one state rather than another was to be accorded
that power. To put an extremely simple case: if P and D start out on
a motor trip from State X, with P as guest and D as owner-driver,
and while driving through State Y, D learns that his brakes are defec-
tive, and this defect leads to a collision and P's injury in State Z, how
does one determine whether State X or State Y or State Z has 'legis-
lative jurisdiction" to determine the rights and duties between P and
D?"7 The short answer is that one cannot, because, unless some further
theoretical basis enables a forum to choose among X, Y, and Z, or even
to reject all of them, 'legislative jurisdiction" rests on some unarticu-
lated principle that makes it proper to look to one rather than another
of the states concerned.
However, if this first hurdle of why the law of Z was to be selected
rather than the law of X or Y or the forum was surmounted, the theo-
retical basis for the forum's decision was simplified. It was no longer
confronted with the theoretical impossibility of applying law that was
not law because it was the law of a foreign sovereign. It was enforcing
obligations-vested rights-of the parties. On the academic side the
concepts of vested rights and legislative jurisdiction are principally
associated with Professor Beale and these views became the dominant
philosophy of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws when it was issued
in 1934 and of Beale's treatise which followed in 1935.18
Imperative rules were enunciated in the Restatement. The validity
of a contract including capacity, form, mutual assent, and considera-
tion were said to be governed by the law of the place of contracting,19
and elaborate rules were established to determine the place of con-
tractig. 20 In the field of torts the law of the place of wrong determined
liability,21 causation, 22 damages,23 and survival,24 and the place of
wrong was established as the place where the last act necessary
to impose liability took place. 5 However, the imperative rules of the
17 Compare Mike v. Lian, 322 Pa. 353, 185 At. 775 (1936), with Lauritzen v.
Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
18 See note 16 supra.
19 lESTATEmENT, CoNrLicT or LAWS § 332 (1934).
20 Id. §§ 311-31.
211d. §§ 379, 391.
22 Id. § 383.
23 Id. § 412.
24 Id. § 390.
25 Id. § 377.
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Restatements vested rights theory recognized two exceptions: (1) a
forum applied its own rules of procedure," and (2) no forum was
required to enforce an obligation that offended its own "strong"
public policy.
27
The vested rights doctrine brought in its wake the need for
"characterizatign."28 Since a forum could apply its own law to a
procedural issue in a case but was required to apply the law of some
other state to a substantive issue, it was necessary to "characterize"
the issue involved as "substance" or "procedure."29 And since on mat-
ters of substance the choice of law might differ depending on whether
the cause of action sounded in tort or contract, a further characteriza-
tion was required. This process of characterization was left to the
forum.30 By use of one or another characterization device a forum
was frequently enabled to select its own law on the grounds that the
issue was procedural,3' or to select between the conflicting laws of
two states depending upon whether it chose to call the issue one of tort
or contract or,3 2 in some instances, family law.33
The Reaction Against the Vested Rights Approach
Act One-Local Law Theory
The vested rights view of Holmes, Beale, and the Restatement was
not without its critics.3 4 What has generally been termed the "local
law" theory emerged.
26 Id. § 585.
27 Id. § 612; see, e.g., Thome v. Macken, 58 Cal. App. 2d 76, 136 P.2d 116 (1943);
Hudson v. Von Harm, 85 Cal. App. 323, 259 Pac. 374 (1927). But cf. Fauntleroy v.
Lune, 210 U.S. 230 (1908) (full faith and credit required recognition of a judgment of
a sister state, no matter how obnoxious the underlying cause of action might be to the
second forum).
2 8 RsESTATMENT, CoNFrICr OF LAws § 584 (1934); see Robertson, A Survey of the
Characterization Problem in the Conflict of Laws, 52 HAxv. L. REV. 747 (1939).
29 See, e.g., Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310
U.S. 650 (1940) (burden of proof of contributory negligence characterized as procedural
under Massachusetts law for choice-of-law purposes, but as substantive to the extent that
the federal court in a diversity case must apply the state rule rather than its own rules of
procedure).
30 RESTmmNT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 584 (1934).
31 See, e.g., Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 F.2d 944 (1953); Kilberg v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
32 See, e.g., Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., supra note 31.
3
3 See, e.g., Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814
(1959).
34 See, e.g., COOK, The Logical and Legal Basis of the Conflict of Law, 33 YALE
L.J. 457 (1924) in THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BAsIs OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws 3 (1942);
LoRENzEN, SELECTED ARtncLEs ON T=E CONFLICT OF LAws 1-18 (1947). See also
Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HAv. L. Rnv. 173 (1933).
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The essential, if over-simplified, thesis of the "local law" theorists
was that no court ever applies or enforces any law other than its own.
Therefore, in any choice-of-law situation the forum applies its own
law, but included in its own law is a body of doctrine that directs it
to use the law of another state in fashioning its rule of decision in
certain cases. As thus formulated, theunderlying rationale of the local
law theory was of inestimable significance to the break away from
the imperative rules concept of Holmes, Beale, and the Restatement.
Its strength lay in the concept that the forum was deciding the case
according to its legal doctrines. When the forum, in its search for the
rule of decision in a given case made use of the legal rules of another
state, it did so as a matter of choice and not because of the supposed
command of a higher body of first principles. Its weakness, however,
was twofold. (1) As originally announced and applied it did little
more than tell the forum to work out its own salvation; it gave the
forum no guide lines to follow in seeking that salvation.3 5 (2) In the
main the decisions that spoke in terms of the local law philosophy
proceeded to reach the same results as those that spoke in terms of
the imperatives of the Restatement.3 6 Thus, Judge Hand, a leading
exponent of local law theory, in tort cases generally applied the law
of the place of impact as the rule of decision because the local law
directed the forum to fashion a rule "as nearly homologous as possible
to that arising in the place where the tort occurs."at Thus far local law
doctrine merely paved the theoretical way for a break-through; it did
not immediately provide the break-through.
Two workmen's compensation cases originating in California-
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Commn3 8 and Pacific Employ-
ers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n39-are probably the key deci-
sions in the growth and development of the local law theory.40
Admittedly, workmen's compensation cases are in a class by them-
selves because of the complex private and public interests involved.
s5 "Cooles and Lorenzen's 'local law theory' . . . has left us without a guide."
EmunqzwEIG, CoNFiac OF LAWS § 4 at 15 (1962).
36 See Cavers, The Two "Local Law" Theories, 63 HARv. L. REv. 822 (1950).
3 7 Guinness v. Miller, 291 Fed. 768, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1923); see Scheer v. Rockne
Motors Corp., 68 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934). But see Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473,
191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
S 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
39 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
40 On the role played by Mr. Justice Stone, the author of the decisions in these
cases, see Cheatham, Stone on Conflict of Laws, 46 COLUM. L. REv. 719 (1946);
Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HtAtv. L. REV. 1210 (1946).
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But the combination of the holdings and reasoning in these cases of-
fered a new approach to the entire subject.
In Alaska Packers the United States Supreme Court held that Cali-
fornia could apply its law to the case of an employee injured in Alaska,
when the employment contract was entered into in California and the
employee, upon termination of employment, was to be returned to
California. The interest of California in the employee, said Mr. Justice
Stone, was not inferior to the interest of Alaska, and hence California
was not required to give fall or any faith and credit to the provisions
of the Alaska act which made that act the exclusive remedy for in-
juries received while employed in Alaska.
In the Pacific Employers case the Supreme Court again sustained
California's application of its law, this time to an employee injured
in California, although the employment contract, the principal area
of employment, and the place to which the employee would eventually
return were all in Massachusetts.
The principal significance of these decisions lay in the fact that
they recognized that the forum was not bound to apply the law of
the place of injury or the place of contract, but was justified in invok-
ing and applying its own internal law in a case with foreign contacts,
when the parties, or any substantial aspect of the transaction, had a
relation to or contact with the forum other than as forum.
The Reaction Against the Vested Rights Approach
Act Two-The Contemporary Views of Currie,
Ehrenzweig, and Others
The vested rights approach of Holmes and the Restatement had
said that the forum should, and in many instances must, apply the
law of another state to determine rights and duties arising out of an
event taking place in that other state. The early local law theorists
had urged, as an intermediate step, that in such a case the forum
applied its own law but fashioned recovery in accordance with the
law of the other state. The current philosophy, principally identified
with Professors Currie4l and Ehrenzweig,42 asserts that the starting
41 See generally Ctrnwm, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws,
1959 DuxE L.J. 171, in SELECETE EssAYs oN THE CoNFICT OF LAWS 177 (1963);
CuamE, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws,
10 STAN. L. PRxv. 205 (1958), in SELECTED ESSAYS ON T CONFLICT OF LAWs 128
(1963).
42 See generally EHmENZWm, CoNFJcT OF LAws §§ 1-10, 101-29 (1962); Ehren-
zweig, Choice of Law: Current Doctrine and "True Rules," 49 CALIF. L. 1,Ev. 240
(1961).
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point for the forum (unless it be a forum wholly unrelated to the
parties and the transaction) is its own internal law and the rule of
decision is fashioned in accordance with that law, unless the forum,
for good reason, chooses to do otherwise.
Within the confines of this article it is impossible to do more than
sketch in the most general terms the views of Currie and Ehrenzweig,
their areas of agreement and of disagreement. Each has written exten-
tively and no summary can do them justice. Both start from essentially
the same premise. Currie has stated: "Normally, even in cases involv-
ing foreign factors, a court should as a matter of course look to the
law of the forum as the source of the rule of decision."48 Ehrenzweig
has expressed a similar view: "It is my basic contention that all through
the field of choice of law the lex fori must remain the starting point
with some or most of our traditional conflicts rules functioning as
exceptions."44
It will be seen, therefore, that in this basic agreement they stand
diametrically opposed to the views of the Restatement and the vested
rights approach. It will also be seen that the local law theory of Hand
and others has been substantially transformed; the forum no longer
looks to the foreign law for any purpose unless the forum choses to
do so. It is at this point, namely the circumstances under which the
forum may or should choose to do so, that the views of Currie and
Ehrenzweig differ.
Currie has expressed what has come to be termed an "interest
analysis" approach.45 His essential thesis is that in a cause involving
foreign contacts the forum should consider the governmental inter-
ests of the forum which will be served in choosing between the law
of the forum and that of another related state in deciding each issue.
Ehrenzweig has denied the validity of an approach based on "govern-
mental interests" and has advocated the recognition of what he has
termed "true rules" 46 derived from a critical analysis of the cases.
However, even with this difference in approach they are in sub-
stantial agreement in one matter which even further distinguishes their
approach from that of the Restatement and most of the local law
48 Cuum, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and
the Judicial Function, 26 U. Cm. L. REv. 9 (1958), in SELEcTED EssAYs ON ,= CoN-
FLICr OF LAws 188 (1963).
44 Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws-Toward a Theory of Enter-
prise Liability Under "Foreseeable and Insurable Laws," 69 YALE L.J. 595 (1960).
(Emphasis added.)
45 See Currie, supra note 43.
46 See EmmNzwmE, CoNFcICT OF LAws §§ 101-29 (1962); Ehrenzweig, Choice of
Law: Current Doctrine and "True Rules," 49 CALm. L. REv. 240 (1961).
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theorists. Both Currie and Ehrenzweig insist-and this, it is submitted,
is the principal characteristic of the new theory-that when the forum
does choose to use the law of another state, it does so with an eye to
and because of the content of that law and its effect on the rights of
the parties. Thus, Ehrenzweig's "true rules" are not merely another
version of vested rights or legislative jurisdiction; they are not rules
designed to direct the forum to a particular jurisdiction; they are rules
for decision and direct the forum to chose the law that will effectuate
a particular result. This is the basic philosophy: the court in a choice-
of-law situation must not automatically apply the rule of a particular
place merely because an event occurred there, without regard to the
content of the rule. To the contrary, the forum before making its
choice of law must be aware of the content of each of the possibly
applicable rules, and make its choice with due regard to the effect of
the content upon the rights of the contending parties.
There is another item of major significance in the current view.
Under the Restatement vested rights approach there was a category
of "torts" and a category of "contracts"-"a tort was a tort" and "a
contract was a contract" without any significant attempt to differen-
tiate among the various types of torts or the various types of contracts,
or to differentiate among the several issues that might be involved in
a tort case or a contract case.48 Under the views now being advocated
there is clear recognition that all matters of tort liability cannot be
put in the same category, that some tort liability is imposed for admoni-
tory purposes and may call for a different treatment than tort liability
that is imposed for compensatory purposes.49 Furthermore, the several
issues that may be involved in a tort case may each require a. different
choice of law.
In the contract field there is the same recognition of differences
depending in part on whether the contract is a so-called "adhesion
contract" or a contract between parties of equal bargaining power"
and in part on the specific issue or issues in controversy. In short there
is no longer the simple process of characterization as a "tort" or a
"contract," but rather the complex analysis of the specific issues in-
4
7 See authorities cited notes 41, 43 supra; EHBENzwEG, CoNma-r oF LAws §§ 175,
221 (1962).
48 "Slowly and against much resistance courts and writers are beginning to recognize
and to admit that the law of contracts has ceased to be a unitary set of rules relating to
a 'bargain' and a 'meeting of the minds,' just as the law of torts has ceased to be a
unitary set of rules relating to a 'wrong."' EHR NZwIG, ComFmcT OF LAws § 172 at
454 (1962).
49 See Id. § 212.
50 See Id. § 172.
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volved, the interests protected or affected by the rules invoked, and
a deliberate search for the substantive rules of law that will best deter-
mine each of the specific issues in controversy.
The Reaction Against the Vested Rights Approach
Act Three-The Courts and the Restatement
The reaction against the vested rights approach is not limited to
the law writers. It is becoming increasingly manifest in the opinions
of courts throughout the United States. The United States Supreme
Court has given it its benediction in such cases as Richards v. United
States,5" Van Dusen v. Barrack,52 and Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd."'
California, by its decisions in Emery v. Emery,54 Grant v. McAuliffe,55
and Bernkrant v. Fowler,56 and New York, by its decisions in Auten v.
Auten,517 Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,58 and Babcock v. Jackson 9
are currently in the forefront. Other states ° are veering away from
the Restatement vested rights approach. It seems now to be conceded
that the 1934 Restatement was in large part "wrong or at least so
over-simplified as to be misleading."
1
Since 1952 a Restatement Second has been in the process of formu-
lation. However, the tentative drafts that have thus far appeared have
met with critical opposition.62 The present consensus appears to be
51369 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1962).
52376 U.S. 612, 643-44 (1964).
58377 U.S. 179, 181 (1964). See also Watson v. Employers Liability Assur. Corp.,
348 U.S. 66 (1954); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); Pearson v. North-
east Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963).
But see the reference to Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., supra, in Van Dusen v.
Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 629 n.24 (1964).
54 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955).
55 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
5655 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961).
57308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
58 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
59 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
60 See, e.g., Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957);
Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963), overruling Gray v. Gray,
87 N.H. 82, 174 Ati. 508 (1934); Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130,
95 N.W.2d 814 (1959), overruling Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342
(1931).
61 Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAw & CoNTma. PYOB.
679, 680 (1963).
62 'Doubts have been expressed repeatedly as to the desirability of such endeavors
at this time." Em qzwErc, CoNlacr oF LAWS § 10 at 34 (1962). "At this stage we
certainly do not need a new Restatement, although we are threatened with one." Currie,
The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAw & CoNrsna,. PRoB. 754, 755 (1963). See also the
Ehrenzweig series Law and Reason Versus the Restatement Second: Miscegenation in
the Conflict of Laws, 45 ComqmL L.Q. 659 (1960); Restitution in the Conflict of Laws,
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against a Restatement Second at this time.63 Justice Traynor has
warned that "as we now finish one long servitude to categorical im-
peratives, we should be on guard against another,"64 and although
this warning was directed against any congressional attempt to enact
choice-of-law rules, it is equally applicable to a new Restatement for-
mulation. The general belief seems to be that courts must be allowed
freedom to develop new approaches, 65 and that the time is not yet
ripe for any attempt at formulation or crystallization of new principles.
In short, at present Restatement First is generally obsolete and
Restatement Second is not yet in sight.
The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and
Choice-of-Law Rules
It has generally been accepted that a forum was subject to some
constitutional limitations in formulating its choice-of-law rules, with
four provisions of the Constitution potentially applicable: full faith
and credit, privileges and immunities, due process, and equal
protection.
Under the vested rights approach a proper choice of law was
frequently declared to be a constitutional command and a forum's
failure to apply the proper law was held to be a denial of due process
of law or a denial of full faith and credit.6 This process was at one
time carried to such an extent that it seemed as if choice-of-law rules
would become a subdivision of constitutional law. In the light of
current developments what is the present status of these constitutional
limitations?
It is now clear that the Supreme Court, by recognizing that the
36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1298 (1961); The "Most Significant Relationship" in the Conflicts Law
of Torts, 28 LAw & CoNTrmar. PROB. 700 (1963).
6 3 See generally the symposium New Trends in the Conflict of Laws, 28 LAw &
CONTEM. PROB. 673 (1963).
64 Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAs L. REv. 657, 675 (1959).
65 See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1962).
66 See, e.g., Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe, 331 U.S.
586 (1947) (full faith and credit); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S.
178 (1936) (full faith and credit); Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land
Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934) ("guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Bradford Elec.
Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932) (full faith and credit); Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209 (1922) (no specific provision cited); New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918) ("liberty of contract guaranteed to all by the
Fourteenth Amendment"). See also Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 414 (1955) (dis-
senting opinion by Frankfurter, J.).
67 See Leflar, Constitutional Limits on Free Choice of Law, 28 LAw & CoNT'mpm.
PROB. 706 (1963).
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vested rights theory is not a constitutional mandate,"" has greatly re-
duced the role that the Constitution will hereafter play in controlling
a state's choice-of-law rules. But it must also be recognized that a
forum in formulating its rules is not entirely free from constitutional
limitations.69 There is a balance to be struck, and an appreciation and
understanding of that balance requires an historic analysis of the role
that the Constitution has played in controlling a forum's choice of
law, before considering the present and future potential.
As a preliminary basis for such historical analysis and evaluation
of future potential, it is necessary to distinguish between the two roles
that constitutional provisions may play. One role is that of a positive
command requiring that the forum select the law of a particular juris-
diction as the rule of decision in a pending case. The other role is
that of a negative restraint which merely forbids the forum to act
in a certain manner, while leaving it free to -select various other alter-
natives. Under the view that the Constitution imposes positive com-
mands a forum would be required to apply the law of a particular
jurisdiction no matter how much it conflicted with its own law and
no matter how much the transaction related to or had contacts with
the forum. Under the view that the Constitution imposes only negative
restraints a related or interested forum would be free to select between
its own law and the law of another juridiction so long as it did not
discriminate between parties similarly situated, while an unrelated
forum would not be free to apply its own law or policy but would still
enjoy some freedom of choice among the laws of related states.
Positive Commands
The Constitution may provide the source for positive commands
requiring a state to make a specific choice of law in two ways: (1) by
furnishing the basis for congressional legislation under article I powers
or full faith and credit; (2) by Supreme Court application of the full
faith and credit and due process clauses to that end.
Congressional Legislation
There is no doubt that Congress could establish uniform choice-
of-law rules in areas such as interstate and foreign commerce over
which it has plenary legislative power.70 Thus far it has not done so,
68 Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376
U.S. 612, 643-44 (1964); Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
69 "we do not suggest that the application of... state law is free from constitu-
tional limitations." Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 n.41 (1964).
70See generally EHBENZwEiC, CONFLIcr OF LAWS § 9 (1962); Leflar, supra note
67 at 709.
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except in the Federal Tort Claims Act which subjects the United States
to liability for negligence "in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred."71 This should be noted as a sig-
nificant departure from the Restatement doctrine which generally
made tort liability depend on the law of the place where the injury
occurred.
Under the full faith and credit clause Congress is empowered to
prescribe the manner in which the public "Acts, Records and Pro-
ceedings" of a state shall be proved, and "the Effect thereof" in each
state. Prior to 1948 Congress had enacted implementing legislation
only with respect to judicial records and proceedings. In 1948 the
Judicial Code was amended to provide that public acts "shall have
the same full faith and credit in every court.., as they have in the
courts [of the state] from which they are taken."7 2 Whether this
amendment requires anything beyond that already required by the
text of the full faith and credit clause remains to be seen. There is
nothing in the legislative history of the 1948 amendment that sheds
any light on its purpose 7 and while the Supreme Court has alluded
to this change, it has not considered its import.74
Due Process and Full Faith and Credit
Beginning with New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge75 in 1918 the
Supreme Court has frequently invoked the due process and full faith
and credit clauses as requiring a forum to recognize and apply the
law of another state as governing the rights of the parties,76 with
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing77 the extreme example of such an
approach. However, by its decisions in the Alaska Packers and Pacific
Employers cases, 78 followed in 1941 by Griffin v. McCoach,7 a life
insurance case, the Supreme Court has generally indicated that a
forum having jurisdiction over a claim arising out of or related to
activity in the forum state did not have to subordinate its policy to
the policy of the sister state where the relationship was created or
the contract entered into.
7128 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1958). See also the discussion of this provision in Richards
v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6-10 (1962).
7228 U.S.C. § 1738 (1958).
73 The reviser's comment was merely: "This follows the language of Article IV,
section I of the Constitution." Ibid.
74 See, e.g., Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 613-14 n.16 (1951).
75 246 U.S. 357 (1918).
71 See cases cited note 66 supra.
77 See text accompanying note 13 supra.
78 See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
79 313 U.S. 498 (1941).
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In 1947 the decision in Order of United Commercial Travelers of
America v. Wolfe8" indicated a possible return to the principles of
the Dodge and Liebing cases. This matter now appears to be settled
by the 1964 decision in Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd.81 which followed
the views of the Alaska Packers and Pacific Employers cases and clearly
established the rule that in insurance cases the forum state, if it has
substantial contact with the parties or transaction, need not subordi-
nate its laws or policies to those of the state where the contract was
made.
In tort cases the Supreme Court's 1964 decision in Van Dusen v.
Barracks2 has apparently refused to require that an interested forum
in a wrongful death action subordinate its policy on damages to that
of the state in which the act or omission or impact occurred.83 It would
now seem settled that at least in tort, contract, and workmen's com-
pensation cases the due process clause does not prevent an interested
and related forum applying its own law or policy to a transaction.
The current scope and applicability of the full faith and credit
clause requires a further elaboration. In the main the decisions have
used due process and full faith and credit interchangeably.84 Two
comparatively recent decisions dealing specifically with full faith and
credit Hughes v. Fetter5 and Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,86
merit close attention.
In Hughes v. Fetter the Supreme Court held that if Wisconsin
would entertain a wrongful death action arising out of an impact
within its boundaries it must entertain a like action arising out of an
accident in Illinois and said that this result was required by full faith
and credit. At the same time and in the same case the Court suggested
that the forum did not have to give full faith and credit to all of the
Illinois law, but might use its own law for the purpose of measuring
"the substantive rights involved."87 Subsequently the decision in
Hughes v. Fetter was explained on the grounds that "the crucial
factor.., was that the forum laid an uneven hand on causes of action
arising within and without the forum state,"'8 language that is far
more consistent with equal protection than with full faith and credit.
80 331 U.S. 586 (1947).
81377 U.S. 179 (1964).
82 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
83 Compare 376 U.S. at 643-44, with 376 U.S. at 629 n.24.
84 See cases cited note 66 supra.
85 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
88309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963).
87 341 U.S. at 612 n.10.
88 Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 518 (1953).
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In Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc. the Second Circuit followed
the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Kilberg v. Northeast
Airlines, Inc.,89 applying the New York policy on measure of damages
to a wrongful death case arising out of a Massachusetts accident
even though plaintiff pleaded his cause of action "under" the Massa-
chusetts act, and held that full faith and credit did not require that
the forum apply that portion of the Massachusetts act limiting the
amount of recovery. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Pearson
and subsequently in Van Dusen v. Barrack0 (identical with Pearson
except for the fact that the case originated in the federal district court in
Pennsylvania) held that the Pennsylvania courts could "recognize the
cause of action based on the Massachusetts Death Act but would not
[have to] apply that statute's ... damage limitation."91
These decisions, it is submitted, completely negate any substantial
role for the full faith and credit clause in choice-of-law cases. To sug-
gest as did Hughes v. Fetter, or to hold as did Van Dusen v. Barrack,
that the forum is privileged to apply its own rule of damages is to
require no more than partial faith and credit-a faith and credit to
those policies that do not conflict with the policies of the forum-and
the most that can be said is that the Supreme Court will determine
when the forum is and when it is not justified in invoking its own
policies."' But the criteria for determining when the forum is or is
not so justified simply cannot be found in or read into the full faith
and credit clause.
As previously indicated the first problem in any given choice-of-
law situation is the determination of whether the forum can or should
apply its own law or whether it must look to the law of another juris-
diction. Before it can be said that full faith and credit must be given
the law of another state, a preliminary determination must be made
that the law of the state to which such faith and credit must be given
is the only law that may constitutionally be applied to determine that
issue. There is nothing in the concept of full faith and credit that
furnishes a guide, let alone finally determines, the one jurisdiction
to which the forum must turn. Therefore, unless, and until some
89 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
90376 U.S. 612 (1964).
91 Id. at 644. But see: "The defendants, rejecting the view adopted by the Second
Circuit in Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.... contend that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause requires Pennsylvania courts to follow all the terms of the Massachusetts Death
Act. We intimate no view concerning this contention." Id. at 629 n.24. (Emphasis
added.)
9 2 See Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 523 (1953) (dissenting opinion
by Jackson, J.); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
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authoritative legislation or some other constitutional command re-
quires that the forum look to the law of another state, there is nothing
to which full faith and credit must be given. Some of the decisions
applying full faith and credit in the past, and most of the views of
dissenting justices in cases where full faith and credit was not given,
have proceeded on the assumption, express or implied, that some
unarticulated "first principle" required the forum to apply the law
of a particular state to the determination of the case.93 But if the
imperative rules of Holmes, Beale, and the Restatement are no longer
elevated to the status of constitutional commands, the "first principle"
does not exist and full faith and credit has nothing on which to operate.
To put it briefly and tersely, full faith and credit cannot determine a
choice-of-law problem; it can only determine the scope and content
of the law after the choice-of-law problem has been otherwise resolved.
Negative Restraints
In Home Ins. Co. v. Dick" the Supreme Court held that Texas,
as the forum state, violated due process of law" by applying its own
law to invalidate a clause in an insurance contract when it had no
contact with or relation to the transaction or parties, other than as
forum. There seems no reason to doubt the continued validity of the
Dick decision. During the 1963 term it has been referred to by the
Supreme Court with seeming approbation." It may be assumed that
the due process clause is applicable to prevent an unreasonable or
unrelated choice of law by a disinterested forum.
Thus far there has been little application of the two anti-discrimi-
nation clauses of the Constitution-privileges and immunities and
equal protection. Both these clauses have the same ultimate objective-
the prevention of discriminatory treatment through unreasonable clas-
sification. Although there are differences in their scope and impact,
for the purposes of this discussion they can be considered together. It
seems clear that there is a role for these clauses to play in requiring a
state, whatever its choice-of-law rules may be, to apply those rules
with an even hand to all similarly situated, and to justify on reasonable
grounds the application of different rules to situations that appear
similar but are in fact distinguishable. 1
98 See, e.g., Mr. justice Jackson's dissent in Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., note
4 supra.
94281 U.S. 397 (1930).
95 Since the transaction was centered in Mexico, full faith and credit was inap-
plicable.
96 Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376
U.S. 612, 639 n.41 (1964).
9 7 See Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws:
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To the extent that courts in the future continue to depart from
traditional views and apply forum law under an "interest analysis"
approach, they will at times apply one rule when one (or both) of
the parties resides in the forum state and a different rule when neither
party is a resident. This is clearly a situation in which- the party ag-
grieved by such a choice, particularly when that party is a non-
resident receiving less favorable treatment than the resident,9" will
invoke the equal protection and privileges and immunities clauses
against such disparate rules. Those who advocate the interest analysis
approach believe that such differences in result are justifiable and do
not pose any serious problem under either clause. 99 While there is
much force to their argument all that can be said at this time is that
no case has yet been presented which clearly raised this issue, and how
the Supreme Court of the United States will decide it remains to be
seen.
In Conclusion: Three Caveats for the Reader
Caveat Number One. The decisions of courts such as California
and New York, which are questioning and repudiating the imperative
rules of the Restatement, are not as yet establishing new rules. These
courts are doing no more than deciding individual cases as they come
before them. Thus, Professor Cheatham commenting on the New York
Court of Appeals decision in Babcock v. Jackson; observed: "If I could
ask my old colleague, Karl Llewellyn, what this case means, he would
answer: 'As every case, it means what the lawyers and judges who
come after have wit to make it mean.""100
It would appear to be the grossest error to suppose that California,
in Grant v. McAuliffe, established either the rule that the cause of
action survived the death of the tort feasor when the action was
brought in California, or the rule that the action survived when the
tort feasor was a resident of California. It would be equally wrong
Privileges and Immunities, 69 YAxL L.J. 1323 (1960), in Cuuus SELECTED EssAYs oN
Trm CoNFLicr OF LAWS 445 (1963); Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination
in the Conflict of Laws: Equal Protection, 28 U. Cm. L. Pnv. 1 (1960), in CUMu3u,
SErcTED ESSAYS ON TnE CoNFLicT OF LAWS 526 (1963).
98 See Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), and
Trauth v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., Civil No. 149-256, S.D.N.Y., 1961, commented on in
Cnuum, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 Du=n L.J. 1, in SE.ETED
ESSAYS oN THE CoNmcT OF LAws 690 (1963) (both cases involving the same airplane
crash as Kilberg, Pearson, and Van Dusen).
99 See authorities cited note 97 supra.
100 Cavers, Cheatham, Currie, Ehrenzweig, Leflar & Reese, Comments on Babcock




to suppose that New York, in Kilberg, held that damages in wrongful
death actions brought in New York will always be governed by New
York law. To paraphrase Karl Llewellyn's statement, these cases will
mean whatever the judges who come after decide to make them mean.
For the moment all these decisions mean is that courts are viewing
critically the Restatement rules and the assumptions on which they
were based. Each decision must be carefully analyzed for the purpose
of determining the techniques employed, the criteria deemed relevant,
and the considerations ignored by the court in deciding any particular
case. Eventually principles may emerge, but for the present the courts
are obviously feeling their way along new paths and seem deliberately
to be avoiding the establishment of new categorical rules.1' 1
This will pose a new and difficult problem for the advocate in
those jurisdictions which have abandoned total reliance on the Re-
statement. What arguments are to be made, what information is
needed, and how is that information to be brought before the court
to convince it that it should apply the law of one rather than another
state to the resolution of the issue involved?1 2 These are matters that
will at times tax the ingenuity and resources of counsel; there is no
attempt here to suggest an answer or to do more than indicate the
existence of one more problem in this area.
Caveat Number Two. Beware the language used to explain or
justify the result reached in any given case. There is a great deal of
new wine being poured into old bottles in the form of current decisions
reaching results diametrically opposed to Restatement rules, but em-
ploying characterization devices to explain the result in traditional
terms. The California decision in Grant v. McAuliffe is one of the clear-
est examples of this approach, justifying the result reached, at least
in part, on the grounds that survival of tort actions is a matter of
procedure to be governed under traditional Restatement doctrine by
the lex fori. The New York decision in Kilberg did the same thing by
characterizing the measure of damages in a wrongful death case as
procedural and therefore governed by the law of the forum. This
resort to a procedural characterization is nothing more than window
dressing and must be recognized as such, just as it has been so recog-
nized by the courts which have employed it. Justice Traynor, author of
101 See text accompanying note 64 supra.
10 2 See Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266
(1961), 49 CALW. L. REV. 962; CulRuE, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Auto.
mation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. Rv. 205 (1958), in SErEcrED EssAys oN
TaE Co _r~cT OF LAws 128 (1963).
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the California court's opinion in Grant v. McAuliffe, has already made
this clear in his speech before the Texas Bar Association when he said:
It may not be amiss to add that although the opinion in the case
is my own, I do not regard it as ideally articulated, developed as it
had to be against the brooding background of a petrified forest. Yet
I would make no more apology for it than that in reaching a rational
result it was less deft than it might have been to quit itself of the
familiar speech of choice of law.10 3
The New York Court of Appeals in Davenport v. Webb"e4 and
Babcock v. Jackson'°5 has clearly indicated that the emphasis in Kilberg
was not on a "procedural" rule of the forum but on the interest of
New York in applying its own "policy" to determine the rights of
the parties.
The use of characterization terminology has produced some unfor-
tunate results. Some writers, taking the language of the decision at
face value, have decried the results as erroneous in the light of what
was traditionally regarded as governed by the lex fori. Other writers
have recognized the decisions for what they were, but deplored the
path followed and the assumed need of the courts to resort to what
was in fact a fictional approach. Undoubtedly these decisions, by
employing what are at best tenuous characterizations, will confuse
courts and counsel who do not recognize them for what they are,
namely, the mere pasting on of a label designed to convince the user
that the result is more palatable than it would have been without the
label.
Caveat Number Three. At present and for some time to come
choice of forum may well determine choice of law and the outcome
of the case. This sounds like the greatest of heresies to those who
have so strongly urged the desirability for uniformity in conflict of
laws rules to the end that, regardless of the forum, the outcome would
be the same. To supporters of the Restatement position this potential
for forum shopping is one of the most serious objections to the current
103Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L. lEv. 657, 670 n.35
(1959).
104 11 N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E.2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962).
105 "The emphasis in Kilberg was plainly that the merely fortuitous circumstance
that the wrong and injury occurred in Massachusetts did not give that State a controlling
concern or interest in the amount of the tort recovery as against the competing interest
of New York in providing its residents or users of transportation facilities there originat-
ing with full compensation for wrongful death. Although the Kilberg case did not
expressly adopt the 'center of gravity' theory, its weighing of the contacts or interests of
the respective jurisdictions to determine their bearing on the issue of the extent of the
recovery is consistent with that approach." 12 N.Y.2d at 480, 191 N.E.2d at 282-83, 240
N.Y.S.2d at 748.
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trend. Concededly forum shopping is undesirable, but it must also
be conceded that it has been with us in the past even though it may
now be with us in more accentuated form.
This problem is dramatically illustrated by the numerous cases
arising out of the crash of the commercial airliner in Boston on October
4, 1960 which have already given us the Kilberg, Pearson, and Van
Dusen decisions. Suits in Massachusetts were governed by the Massa-
chusetts statute limiting recovery to not more than 15,000 dollars.
Suits in state and federal courts in New York on behalf of New York
decedents were governed by the New York policy prohibiting any
statutory limitation on recovery."0 6 Suits in federal court in Pennsyl-
vania on behalf of Pennsylvania decedents were held to be governed
by Pennsylvania's choice-of-law rule which could either follow its own
policy against limitation of damages or apply the Massachusetts
limitation. 07
Furthermore, in connection with such matters the Supreme Court
in Van Dusen v. Barrack has held that if a suit is properly brought in
an appropriate federal district court and the case is transferred to a
district court in another state under section 1404(a) of the Judicial
Code, 08 the choice-of-law rules of the transferor forum "generally"
will govern in the transferee court. The opinion in Van Dusen on this
issue is replete with qualifications'09 so that its full scope cannot as yet
be determined, but it is a significant recognition of the fact that the
plaintiff has' considerable power to select the state or federal forum
most favorable to his cause, provided only he selects a reasonable
forum.
106 But cf. Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)
(surviving spouse moved to Maryland; Massachusetts limitation applied because Mary-
land would have done so).
10 7 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
108 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1958).
109 "We conclude, therefore, that in cases such as the present, where the defendants
seek transfer, the transferee District Court must be obligated to apply the state law that
would have been applied if there had been no change of venue. A change of venue
under § 1404(a) generally should be, with respect to state law, but a change of court-
rooms. We, therefore, reject the plaintiffs' contention that the transfer was necessarily
precluded by the likelihood that a prejudicial change of law would result. In so ruling,
however, we do not and need not consider whether in all cases § 1404(a) would require
the application of the law of the transferor, as opposed to the transferee, State. We do
not attempt to determine whether, for example, the same considerations would govern if
a plaintiff sought transfer under § 1404(a) or if it was contended that the transferor
State would simply have dismissed the action on the* ground of forum non conveniens."
376 U.S. at 639-40. (Emphasis added.)
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